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Criminal law would seem to qualify as public interest law almost by 
definition. Consider the caption of a criminal law case. The first party listed is the 
government, whether labeled People or State or Commonwealth or United States. This 
is because a criminal prosecution is a form of collective litigation, brought by a 
public prosecutor on behalf of all the citizens of the government entity that the 
particular prosecutor represents. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, in 
representing the public, the prosecutor’s interest is not the narrow one of winning 
a case. Rather, prosecutors must be “guided solely by their sense of public 
responsibility for the attainment of justice.”1 
Even defense lawyers practicing criminal law can be considered to be 
involved with public interest law. True, they are required to be zealous advocates 
for their clients, to whom their loyalty is owed. But the criminal law system 
requires this zealous advocacy to assure citizens that the power of the state is 
being wielded properly. History teaches us that no matter how lofty our 
aspirations for the public prosecutor, not every prosecutor is pure and not every 
prosecution is meritorious. 
If criminal law is public interest law, does it matter if we put the word business 
in front of crime? Isn’t the prosecution and defense of business crime as much a 
 
* Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
1. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987); see also Berger 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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matter of public interest law as the prosecution and defense of any other type of 
crime? 
The short answer is yes; the longer answer is yes and no. Business crime is a 
branch of the criminal law, but it is also a branch of economic regulatory law. As 
in all criminal matters, prosecutors must still act to advance the public’s interest in 
justice, and defense lawyers must still act to protect their clients’ interests and 
check potential abuses of public power. But the regulatory aspect of business 
crime also poses some particular challenges and opportunities for all participants 
in the criminal justice process. This includes not only prosecutors and defense 
counsel, but legislators as well. 
In this Article, I explore some of the unique connections between business 
crime and the public interest. I begin with providing some definition for the types 
of crimes I am discussing. Next, I discuss some examples of the particular 
challenges facing prosecutors, defense counsel, and legislators in this area. I 
conclude with some observations on achieving the public good in business crime 
in the administrative state. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS CRIME 
I define a business crime as a crime committed during the normal course of 
business operations, for economic reasons, mostly by or on behalf of legitimate 
business organizations.2 As a general matter, these are not crimes of intentional 
violence, although some of them do cause physical harm. Nor are these crimes 
defined by the socioeconomic status of the offender, although many of the 
defendants in business crime prosecutions are white-collar criminals. Rather, most 
business crime is organizational crime, and most business crime statutes are but 
one aspect of a more complex effort to regulate harmful business behavior. In this 
sense, business crimes are a component of the regulatory, or administrative, state. 
The initial period of business crime legislation came at the dawn of the 
regulatory state, from 1887 to 1914. This period featured the enactment of the 
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887,3 the Sherman Act in 1890,4 and the Pure Food 
and Drug Act in 1906.5 The Interstate Commerce Act established the first major 
federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission.6 The 
Commission was given jurisdiction over a number of railroad practices, many of 
which involved discrimination in price or service between shippers, and Congress 
made it a crime (a misdemeanor) willfully to violate the Act.7 Subsequent 
 
2. See HARRY FIRST, BUSINESS CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxi (1990). 
3. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C). 
4. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)). 
5. Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938). 
6. See Interstate Commerce Act § 11. 
7. Id. § 10. 
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prosecutions for violating railroad regulatory legislation established some of the 
important precedents in the business crime area.8 The Sherman Act made it a 
crime to engage in unreasonable restraints of trade and to monopolize. 
Prosecutions under this statute similarly established important precedents, and 
Sherman Act prosecutions continue to be an important part of business crime 
enforcement today.9 Finally, the Pure Food and Drug Act initiated government 
supervision over foods and drugs offered in interstate commerce to ensure that 
they were not adulterated or misbranded, with violations of the Act to be 
criminally prosecuted.10 Prosecutions under a successor statute helped establish 
the validity of no fault public welfare criminal offenses.11 
The second important period for business crime legislation was the New 
Deal, when the major shift to the modern administrative state occurred. For 
business crime, key statutes during this period were the Securities Act of 193312 
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,13 establishing the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to oversee the issuance and trading of financial 
securities in the United States, as well as to regulate the exchanges on which these 
securities are traded. In addition to the enforcement powers given to the newly-
created SEC, the Acts criminalized willful violations of their provisions.14 As a 
result, responsibility for the enforcement of the securities laws is shared by the 
administrative agency (the SEC) and the prosecutor (the Justice Department). 
Violators may thus face administrative and criminal penalties. 
The third important period was the environmental/consumer protection 
period, from 1968 to 1977. During this period, Congressional attention was 
focused on some of the significant negative effects of a successful industrial 
economy—polluted air and water and unsafe products and workplaces. As with 
the early regulation of food and drugs, a major concern here was that business 
firms, in their drive for profits, might cause substantial physical harm, an 
important traditional concern of the criminal law, of course. In these statutes, 
 
8. See, e.g., New York Central & H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909) 
(establishing the principle of corporate criminal liability and upholding the constitutionality of the 
Elkins Act of 1903). 
9. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (application of Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
to investigation of corporations for criminal conduct); Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the 24th Annual National Institute on White Collar 
Crime (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf 
(reviewing the growth of criminal antitrust prosecutions); Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Corporate 
Fine of $10 Million or More, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/ 
sherman10.pdf (listing ninety-seven fines as of Sept. 20, 2012). 
10. See supra note 5. 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278–79 (1943). 
12. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)). 
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78pp (2006)). 
14. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78ff (2006). 
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Congress replicated the pattern set in earlier regulatory legislation—the 
establishment of regulatory agencies with civil enforcement powers (e.g., the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection 
Agency) and the criminalization of willful or knowing violations, with 
enforcement to be handled by the Justice Department.15 
Supporting the regulatory superstructure of business crime is a wide variety 
of general and specific federal statutes that prosecutors can use as the situation 
warrants. The broadest statutes are the mail and wire fraud statutes, descendants 
of the original mail fraud statute enacted in 1872 to prevent large-scale swindles,16 
and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),17 which 
increases penalties for certain multiple violations of business crime statutes. These 
statutes have been supplemented by more specific statutes criminalizing, for 
example, health care fraud and foreign bribery.18 
Although there is no single source of statistics regarding the incidence of 
business crime or its prosecution, it is safe to say that the criminal prosecution of 
business behavior was generally considered to be weak through the mid-twentieth 
century.19 More recently, however, there has been a decided increase both in the 
public perception that criminal sanctions are appropriate in business crime cases, 
as well as an increased willingness of prosecutors to bring such cases. Large fines 
and lengthy prison terms for a wide range of behavior—off-label pharmaceutical 
drug sales, price fixing cartels, foreign bribery, insider trading, to name a few—
have underscored the importance of this area of the criminal law.20 
II. CHALLENGES FOR PRIVATE LAWYERS 
The traditional paradigm of the criminal lawyer is the zealous advocate 
defending a client at trial or, perhaps more realistically, in plea negotiations. For a 
 
15. See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7413(c) (2006). 
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968. 
18. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (2006); 
18 U.S.C. § 1347 (health care fraud). 
19. For the classic critique, see generally EDWIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
(1949). 
20. See, e.g., Chad Bray, Longest Sentence in Insider Case Set, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2012, at C3 
(noting a twelve-year sentence in an insider trading scheme); GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 
Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ( July 2, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html; JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 
6, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-431.html (noting $1.5 billion total 
penalties obtained so far for a scheme to bribe Nigerian government officials); Yazaki Corp., Denso 
Corp. and Four Yazaki Executives Agree to Plead Guilty to Automobile Parts Price-fixing and Bid-Rigging 
Conspiracies, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ( Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press 
_releases/2012/279734.htm (noting $548 million in fines against two companies and jail sentences for 
four foreign nationals ranging from fifteen months to two years). 
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defense lawyer in the business crime area, however, going to trial represents a 
professional failure. Although sometimes trials cannot be avoided, a major goal of 
the business crime lawyer is to make sure that his or her client is never formally 
charged with a crime in the first place. Criminal charges can have a significant 
effect on a company’s reputation and business, or on an executive’s reputation. 
Even if an acquittal results, civil lawsuits may follow. Convictions can bring harsh 
penalties, including possible debarment from engaging in certain kinds of 
business. 
Thus, for business crime, the real paradigm is lawyer as counselor. In 
traditional crimes, clients do not generally consult lawyers before engaging in 
criminal behavior. Business crimes, though, are done in the course of an ongoing 
business, presenting the opportunity for prior consultation and for a business 
crime lawyer to just say no. 
Consider two recent cases. One involved a practice of rotating bids at public 
auctions for municipal tax liens. Apparently, for a nine-year period, a group of at 
least seven real estate investors would come to these auctions without a 
preconceived plan to allocate bids but would then informally practice a round-
robin approach to bidding, with each bidder going in turn.21 Had any of these 
bidders thought of consulting their lawyers they would have found out that an 
agreement could be inferred from this practice, even if the parties did not formally 
agree to this behavior beforehand. A good counselor would have pointed out that 
such auction behavior could land the participants in jail and that they should stop 
doing it. Whether these investors ever sought such advice is not known, but the 
Justice Department has brought criminal charges against six of the investors, all of 
whom have pleaded guilty.22 
The second case is unfolding as this Article is being written. It involves 
rather extensive email correspondence and likely other discussions between 
executives of two major oil and gas exploration companies—Chesapeake Energy 
Corp. and Encana.23 These emails show that executives from both companies 
were in contact with each other regarding their bidding on land that potentially 
contained extensive amounts of oil and gas.24 Prior to these emails, the two 
companies had bid against each other at land auctions; after the emails, they did 
not.25 What seems clear at this point is that both companies and their executives 
 
21. Telephone Interview with David Glovin, Reporter, Bloomberg News (Mar. 15, 2012). 
22. See New York Financial Investor Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging at Municipal Tax Lien Auctions in 
New Jersey, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press 
_releases/2012/281630.htm; see also David Voreacos & David Glovin, Tax-Lien Probe Wins Sixth N.J. 
Plea as Lawyer Admits Guilt, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
03-27/tax-lien-probe-wins-sixth-n-j-plea-as-lawyer-admits-guilt-1-.html. 
23. See generally Brian Grow et al., Energy Rivals Plotted to Suppress Land Prices, REUTERS ( June 
25, 2012), http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/12/06/ChesapeakeLand.pdf. 
24. Id. at 2. 
25. Id. at 4–5. 
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could have avoided their coming legal problems had they been better counseled 
(or, perhaps, had they paid more attention to what their lawyers told them). 
Proper counseling would have enabled them to understand that they should not 
discuss sensitive bidding matters with their competitors and could face possible 
criminal charges for doing so. 
As these two cases show, in some ways the private lawyer’s role as counselor 
in business crime matters is analogous to a role played by government officials in 
the criminal justice system. Counseling a client not to commit a crime advances 
not only the client’s true self-interest but also the public’s interest in crime 
prevention. 
Private lawyers in the business crime area also play a public interest role in 
advancing the detection and investigation of business crime. Today, they do so in 
at least two ways. 
The first is through assisting clients in adopting and implementing an 
“effective compliance and ethics program,” as set out in the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.26 These programs are corporate-wide processes designed to “prevent 
and detect criminal conduct” and to promote corporate compliance with the law.27 
As part of these compliance programs, the Sentencing Guidelines envision that 
companies will not only investigate corporate wrongdoing but will also take 
“reasonable steps” after detecting criminal conduct to prevent future violations, 
including “self-reporting and cooperation with authorities” when appropriate.28 As 
incentive to adopt and implement these compliance programs, as well as to report 
violations to prosecutors, the Sentencing Guidelines provide that companies can 
obtain steep discounts from normally imposed criminal fines, potentially reducing 
their fines to five percent of what they would otherwise have been.29 
The second way that business lawyers take on the investigative role of the 
public prosecutor is more case-specific. Beginning with the corporate accounting 
scandals of the early 2000s, prosecutors have developed a new tool to investigate 
and prosecute business crime.30 The tool involves either deferring the prosecution 
of a corporation (a deferred prosecution agreement or DPA), or agreeing not to 
prosecute the corporation at all (a non-prosecution agreement or NPA), in return 
for the corporation’s agreement to investigate the wrongdoing in question and 
turn the results of that investigation over to the prosecutor.31 The benefit to the 
targeted corporation is that it will not be convicted of (or, in an NPA, not even 
charged with) a crime. The benefit to the prosecution is that private lawyers, 
 
26. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 (2011). 
27. See id. § 8B2.1(a)(1). 
28. See id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.6. 
29. See id. §§ 8C2.4–8C2.6. 
30. See generally Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business 
Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23 (2010) (discussing prosecutorial approaches to business crime). 
31. See generally id. (discussing the history and use of these agreements). 
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working with corporate personnel, may be able to investigate corporate 
wrongdoing more efficiently than can an outside prosecutor. 
As a result of prosecutorial use of DPAs and NPAs, the public corporation 
has now become, in effect, a branch office of the prosecutor. Many defense 
lawyers and commentators have been critical of this new branch-office role, 
believing that these agreements are coercive of corporations and indifferent to the 
welfare of individual employees, who may too readily be thrown under the bus by 
their corporate employers anxious to avoid criminal charges.32 Nevertheless, the 
use of these agreements is now well-established, having been used by the Justice 
Department in both Republican and Democratic administrations, and these 
agreements are likely to be a continuing feature of business crime cases.33 
The counseling and investigating function that private counsel must perform 
in business crime prosecutions represents a paradigm shift for the criminal justice 
system. It constitutes a more explicit alignment of private counsel with the public 
interest goal of preventing, detecting, and punishing crime. The challenge for 
private counsel is to perform this public interest role while at the same time 
performing the traditional role of defense counsel in the criminal justice system—
to be zealous advocates for their clients’ private interests. 
III. CHALLENGES FOR PROSECUTORS 
Business crime is generally organizational crime, often involving behavior 
that is not clearly morally wrong and which might be handled through the 
administrative process rather than (or in addition to) the criminal process. All of 
these factors add layers of complexity to the kinds of decisions that prosecutors 
normally make. I have picked a few examples to highlight some of the challenges 
that prosecutors face. 
I start with the Betty Vinson story to illustrate the problems of the charging 
decision.34 Betty Vinson was a senior-level accountant at WorldCom, which was a 
small long-distance telephone company when she joined. It grew, however, to be a 
major telecommunications company, primarily through its acquisition of MCI 
Communications Corp. In the mid-2000s she was asked by her boss to make an 
adjustment in certain accounts so that the company would meet Wall Street’s 
earnings expectations for the quarter.35 Although she made the changes, she was 
 
32. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 913–19 (2007) 
(discussing criticisms); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 71–75 (2006) (discussing arguments about abusive government tactics). 
33. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 2011 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements ( Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/ 
2011yearendupdate-corporatedeferredprosecution-nonprosecutionagreements.pdf (detailing continued 
use of agreements in 2010 and 2011). 
34. For details see Susan Pulliam, Over the Line: A Staffer Ordered to Commit Fraud Balked, Then 
Caved, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2003, at A1. 
35. Id. at A6. 
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sufficiently uncomfortable with them to indicate that she was going to resign.36 A 
meeting with the chief financial officer of WorldCom ensued, in which he 
promised her that he would try to fix the company’s problems and asked her not 
to leave before they were fixed. So she stayed.37 Each quarter, though, things got 
worse, and she continued to make adjustments that she knew were improper. As 
the fraud began to unravel, Vinson and two co-workers met with representatives 
from the Justice Department, the SEC, and the FBI and told them what they had 
done.38 One day later, WorldCom contacted the SEC and disclosed that it had 
found $3.8 billion in improper accounting entries.39 
Vinson’s meeting took place in Jackson, Mississippi, the location of 
WorldCom’s headquarters.40 The U.S. Attorney in Jackson initially indicated to 
Vinson’s lawyer that he would likely view her as a witness, not as a defendant. 
Soon after the investigation began, however, Justice Department officials in 
Washington decided to assign the case to the U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York.41 Prosecutors in that office have traditionally been very 
aggressive in securities fraud prosecutions.42 They saw her statements as a 
confession, not a tip-off of wrongdoing. To them, she was no longer a witness 
but, ultimately, an indicted defendant.43 Vinson eventually pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced to five months in jail and five months of house arrest.44 
What was the correct prosecutorial decision in Betty Vinson’s case? Good 
arguments can be made either way. She was a fairly high-level employee but was 
still subject to the directives of upper management. She physically made the 
fraudulent entries but wrestled with what she was doing and eventually disclosed 
her wrongdoing at a time when government investigators did not know all that 
had happened. In fact, different offices of the same Justice Department viewed 
the case differently (all U.S. Attorneys Offices are part of the Department of 
Justice). Of course, some decision had to be made, one way or the other. Vinson’s 
case is a reminder that the decision will likely be difficult. 
My second story involves Andrew Fastow, the former chief financial officer 
of Enron, and it involves the question of trading up. Unlike Vinson, Fastow was a 
key player in an accounting fraud, one that eventually led to the bankruptcy of his 








42. See Benjamin Weiser & Peter Lattman, U.S. Prosecutor Sends a Message to Wall Street, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 13, 2011, at B1 (discussing aggressive litigation of securities law violations). 
43. Pulliam, supra note 34, at A6. 
44. See Shawn Young & Dionne Searcey, Executives on Trial: Former Executive at WorldCom Gets 
5-Month Jail Term, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2005, at C3. 
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others dealing with his firm and was not simply following the directives of his 
superiors. Vinson’s financial gain was that she kept her job and her $80,000 salary; 
Fastow made millions.45 
Fastow did not escape criminal prosecution, and his conduct was not as 
morally ambiguous as Vinson’s. But he did have an important asset that Vinson 
lacked, and this is where another challenge to prosecutors lies. Fastow had detailed 
understanding of what his superiors—the former CEOs of Enron, Kenneth Lay, 
and Jeffrey Skilling—had done and how they had done it.46 With his testimony, 
the prosecutors would have a good chance of convicting the people at the very 
top of Enron; without his testimony (or the testimony of other participants in the 
fraud), the prosecutors would likely have to rely on documentary evidence, a much 
less compelling form of evidence. 
Standard practice in these situations is to trade up—to reduce the penalty for 
smaller fish in order to get the larger. Ironically, this means that those who know 
little have little to trade; only the more culpable individuals have a tradable asset.47 
The question then becomes, how much can a highly culpable but slightly low-level 
or mid-level executive get for disclosing his knowing involvement in a business 
crime and implicating his superiors? 
The deal the prosecutors struck with Fastow was a ten-year sentence in 
return for a guilty plea and cooperation.48 The original deal carried the threat of 
additional charges if Fastow did not cooperate fully. It did not promise a sentence 
reduction if he did; in fact, the agreement specifically provided that the 
prosecutors would not ask for a sentence reduction because of cooperation.49 By 
the time Fastow came up for sentencing two years later, however, Skilling and Lay 
had been convicted, and Fastow had provided very effective testimony, along with 
his deep understanding of how Enron functioned. The sentencing judge, with no 
objection from prosecutors, reduced the agreed-upon sentence by forty percent, 
from ten years down to six.50 
 
45. See Plea Agreement at 11–16, United States v. Fastow, 300 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D. Tex. 
2004) (detailing self-dealing transaction in which Fastow was personally enriched), available at http:// 
news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/usafastow11404plea.pdf. 
46. See John R. Emshwiller & Thaddeus Herrick, Fastow Plea Deal May Boost Cases Against 
Enron’s Ex-CEOs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2004, at A3. 
47. For instance, Betty Vinson’s former boss, Scott Sullivan, the CFO of WorldCom, received 
a five-year sentence after testifying against WorldCom’s CEO, Bernie Ebbers, who received a twenty-
five year sentence. See Allan Murray, Executives in Trouble Now Know to Sing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2005, 
at A2 (Sullivan’s testimony allowed the government to “land” Ebbers, its “biggest fish”). 
48. See Plea Agreement, supra note 45, at 2. 
49. See id. at 13. 
50. See Kate Murphy & Alexei Barrionuevo, Fastow Sentenced to 6 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2006, at C1. 
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My question here is not whether the four year reduction was a proper judicial 
decision.51 My focus is on the challenges that prosecutors face. At the sentencing 
hearing, should prosecutors have been insistent that the judge stick to the original 
bargain? Would that have been a more just result? Would that have been better for 
deterrence? Was even the original deal just? Skilling was eventually given a 
sentence of over twenty-four years.52 Are the sentences of the two defendants 
proportional to their guilt? 
The question of the appropriate use of the prosecutor’s bargaining and 
charging power can arise in the corporate context as well, and this leads to my 
third story—the deferred prosecution agreement that the Justice Department 
entered into with the accounting firm KPMG. The Justice Department began 
investigating KPMG after Congressional hearings into KPMG’s promotion of 
abusive tax shelters.53 As a public accounting firm, KPMG’s survival as a business 
firm might be in serious doubt if it were to be convicted of criminal tax fraud. 
Seizing on this vulnerability, government lawyers pressed KPMG to enter into a 
deferred prosecution agreement under which KPMG would pay $456 million in 
fines and restitution but, more significantly, would help the Department 
investigate the individual partners and employees involved in selling these tax 
shelters.54 KPMG was to effectuate this assistance by waiving its attorney-client 
privilege and making its employees available for government questioning, the 
latter backed by a threat that noncooperating partners or employees would have 
their legal fees for private counsel withheld and would be fired.55 
The challenges that a prosecutor faces in negotiating a deferred prosecution 
agreement are not quite the mirror image of the challenges that private counsel 
face, as discussed earlier. The challenge for the government prosecutor is to 
consider whether he or she is misusing the power to prosecute and forcing 
bargains inappropriately. In fact, the district court and court of appeals in the 
KPMG case decided that the Justice Department had overstepped its power and 
deprived the subsequently indicted individual defendants of their Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights. The language that the trial judge used is particularly telling: 
Justice is not done when the government uses the threat of indictment—
a matter of life and death to many companies and therefore a matter that 
threatens the jobs and security of blameless employees—to coerce 
companies into depriving their . . . employees of the means of defending 
 
51. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Fastow’s Long Walk to Less Time, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at C1 
(describing criticism of the judge’s decision to reduce the sentence). 
52. Skilling’s sentence was subsequently vacated, but he has yet to be resentenced. See Jeff 
Ifrah & Jeffrey Hamlin, Five Years Later, Skilling’s Sentence Is Still up in the Air, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 15, 
2011), http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/five-years-later-skilling-s-sentence-is-still-up-
2219563.php. 
53. See First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 30, at 50–52. 
54. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 341–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
55. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 147 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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themselves against criminal charges in a court of law. . . . [T]he 
determination of guilt or innocence must be made fairly—not in a 
proceeding in which the government has obtained an unfair advantage 
long before the trial even has begun.56 
Again, I am not so much concerned with whether the court’s decision was 
correct as with the particular challenges that a prosecutor in a business crime case 
faces.57 Prosecuting business crime may be public interest work, but there are no 
perfect guides to ensure that each exercise of prosecutorial discretion is in the 
public interest. For business crime cases, prosecutions must advance not only the 
general interests of justice but also the specific goals of the regulatory regime 
involved. We know that winning a case is not everything, but it is something. How 
to balance the use of tactics that win cases and help deter violations of important 
regulatory statutes against the negative impact of prosecutorial overreaching is the 
prosecutor’s difficult public interest challenge. 
IV. CHALLENGES FOR LEGISLATORS 
The U.S. Code is filled with criminal law, scattered through its many 
volumes—there is no single federal criminal code that has gathered all federal 
crimes in one spot.58 In fact, no one really knows how many federal criminal laws 
exist. Estimates vary from 3,000 to 4,500, but these estimates could be wrong by 
some unknown order of magnitude.59 
As a general matter, it is easier to add to the unorganized corpus of federal 
criminal law than to remove laws that are no longer sensible or, perhaps, never 
were. For political reasons, federal criminal law seems to be a one-way ratchet. 
Being tough on crime offends few; repealing crimes can offend many. This has 
been particularly true with the criminal provisions of economic regulatory statutes. 
When Congress enacts a regulatory scheme its focus is usually on the regulatory 
aspect of the legislation rather than on the criminal provisions of the legislation, 
provisions that are often tacked on for good measure and without much apparent 
thought. 
The result of congressional inattention has been to leave the actual 
implementation of federal business crimes to prosecutorial discretion. In so doing, 
Congress has placed on nonelected prosecutors the burden of making the difficult 
sort of decisions discussed above. The likelihood that Congress will step back into 
its legislative role at this point, however, is slight. Indeed, given how Congress 
 
56. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 381–82. 
57. I have criticized the court’s decision elsewhere. See First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor, supra 
note 30, at 75–81. 
58. The most recent effort to enact such a code failed in 1981. See FIRST, BUSINESS CRIME, 
supra note 2, at 12. 
59. See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Ensnared, WALL 
ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A1. 
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operates today, it is not even clear that the administration of the criminal side of 
federal economic regulation would be improved with additional congressional 
guidance. 
What may be more likely today, however, is some retreat from federal 
economic regulation as a general matter, diminishing the criminal law as a 
necessary consequence. This may be more likely because our current political 
debate is very focused on the proper scope of federal government regulation. This 
debate does not focus on the civil/criminal distinction but, rather, on whether 
government regulation is a good idea at all. 
An example of how this debate could affect federal business crimes, and not 
for the better, is the “Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act” of 2012, cleverly 
known as the “JOBS Act.”60 This legislation was promoted as a deregulatory 
effort to free small firms from the restrictions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed 
in 2002 in the wake of the accounting scandals at companies like Enron and 
WorldCom.61 The idea of the JOBS Act is to allow start-ups to raise capital more 
easily, and its proponents tied this proposition to the idea that start-ups are critical 
for increasing jobs.62 This made the bill hard for both Democrats and Republicans 
to resist. 
What the law may end up doing, however, is increasing the opportunity for 
fraud. The Act relieves firms with less than $1 billion in revenue from financial 
disclosure obligations for up to five years after they go public and allows firms (in 
certain circumstances) to raise money via the Internet (crowdfunding) without 
having audited financial statements.63 In these days of hyped IPOs for Internet-
based companies, these changes could make it much easier to gull investors.64 
Thus, legislators face a challenge when considering the public interest in 
connection with business crime legislation. Today’s well-organized interest groups 
are often looking to narrow down or abolish regulatory protections that restrict 
their ability to pursue profits. The administrative state may need trimming in 
certain circumstances, of course, and profit is, certainly, an important driver of 
economic progress and opportunity, but we also need business crime provisions 
to protect the most vulnerable from being victimized. Legislators could better 
 
60. Jumpstart Our Business Startups ( JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
61. See First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 30, at 41–42 (discussing passage and 
content of Sarbanes-Oxley); Steven M. Davidoff, From Congress Comes a Law Befitting a Sausage Factory, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2012, at B5. 
62. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, JOBS Act Jeopardizes Safety Net for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2012, at B1. 
63. For critical descriptions of the bill, see, for example, Davidoff, supra note 61 (arguing that 
it is uncertain whether the Act “will create jobs or only encourage fraud”); Sorkin, supra note 62 
(arguing that this legislation “dismantles some of the most basic protections for the most susceptible 
investors”). 
64. See Susanne Craig & Ben Protess, Wall Street Examines Fine Print in a Bill for Start-Ups, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2012, at B1 (noting that LinkedIn and Pandora Radio had revenues below $1 billion 
when they went public). 
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advance the public interest by focusing on when the criminal law would be a 
superior vehicle for achieving these protections than private litigation or 
administrative agency action. Knee-jerk decriminalization of economic regulation, 
however, is not public interest law. 
CONCLUSION 
How do lawyers help to achieve the public good in today’s administrative 
state? In looking at lawyers involved with the criminal side of regulation—whether 
they be prosecutors, defense counsel, or legislators—we can see two sometimes 
contradictory pulls. On the one hand, lawyers represent clients and legislators 
represent interest groups. These representational duties push them to win for their 
clients or for the relevant interest groups, to get the clients or the interest groups 
what is in their private interests. On the other hand, lawyers also advance public 
interests. Prosecutors must run a just system, defense counsel can counsel in a way 
that prevents crime, and legislators are responsible to all their constituents to use 
the criminal law in a way that fairly supports the goals of economic regulation. 
As I have indicated with the examples in this Article, achieving the 
appropriate balance between private and public goals will always be challenging. 
The important point is not to forget the challenge. Unless lawyers remain aware of 
the public side of the balance, only private goals will be pursued. Of course, being 
aware of the challenge of the public interest will not necessarily conduce to the 
public good; forgetting about it, though, will be worse. 
  
